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TRUSTS-THE FIDUCIARY ASPECTS OF ESTATE CORPORATIONS-
With the ever-increasing reliance being placed on the corporate 
form by modem business, it is no longer unusual for an executor 
or testamentary trustee to discover that the estate or trust assets 
include the controlling shares in a close corporation, or that the 
testator's will directs him to form a corporation for the purpose 
of taking over and continuing the testator's business or invest-
ment holdings. Such corporations are commonly given the name 
"estate corporations," with the special type formed after testator's 
death further termed "post mortem" corporations. It is the pur-
pose of this comment to examine the existing law with regard to 
estate corporations, in the hope of providing a guide for persons 
contemplating contact with them. 
I. Introduction 
There may be various reasons why an individual would prefer 
that his business interests be continued after his death. These 
might include difficulty in evolving a plan providing for the 
profitable disposal of the interest before or shortly after death, 
or the desirability of retaining the interest for the benefit of his 
family, especially if the business is relatively secure, yields a high 
rate of return, and is blessed with competent management.1 The 
corporate form may be chosen for the continued operation in order 
to assure ease of administration, limitation of liability, simplicity 
in dealing with third parties, continuity of management, avoid-
ance of partition, and quite possibly to obtain tax benefits. 
The realization of these advantages depends in varying degree 
upon the ability of the corporate entity to separate the admin-
istration of the business interests from the confinements of ordi-
nary trusteeship. Just how far this may be done will often be the 
first question raised by the individual considering the use of a 
1 See Durand, "Changing Concepts of Trust Investments," 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
907 (1956). 
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corporation in his estate plan. But because the area of estate 
corporations requires consideration of both the law of trusts and 
that relating to corporations, it must be recognized that the law 
applicable to one or the other may not be automatically relied 
on to supply all the answers. For the same reason, the executor 
or trustee, realizing that competing legal principles are involved, 
will be wary of accepting the fiduciary position unless his duties, 
rights and sanctions have been satisfactorily defined. In other 
words the fiduciary desires primarily that his responsibilities and 
obligations in respect to the estate corporation be plainly marked 
so that an open corridor of "proper" action is available to him. 
Absent such specification, the fiduciary, particularly the corporate 
trustee, may decline the trust and thus frustrate the decedent's 
plans. Although it was declared some twenty years ago that a 
settled body of law would undoubtedly be formulated to con-
trol this subject,2 this prediction has not yet been fulfilled to 
the extent of permitting the law to be stated in terms of anything 
approaching clear cut rules. 
II. Fiduciary Responsibilities of the Trustee 
Initially it will be necessary for the newly-appointed fiduciary 
to establish his right to form a post mortem corporation or to 
continue the corporation previously organized by the decedent.3 
If he should proceed without valid authorization, he will be invit-
ing probable surcharge for any and all losses sustained. The ques-
tion of what amounts to proper authorization is essentially the 
same whether the business sought to be continued is incorporated 
or unincorporated, and is susceptible to firmer generalization than 
most of the problems encountered in estate corporations. Thus 
it may be said that in the absence of the consent of all benefici-
aries and creditors, authority for prolonged continuation of the 
corporate business or for the formation of a post mortem corpor-
ation must be found in the clear expressions of the will.4 In one 
2 See Cahn, "Estate Corporations," 86 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 136 (1937). 
3 See generally Adelman, "The Power to Carry on the Business of a Decedent," 36 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 185 (1937); Polasky, "Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest 
in a Closely Held Business," 44 IowA L. R.Ev. 83 (1958). 
4 Ibid. See also Durand, "Changing Concepts of Trust Investments," 95 TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES 907 (1956); P·H WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUST SERv. fl2193.l at p. 2195 (1950); 27 
VA. L. REV. 497 (1941); Wachtler, "Continuance of a Decedent's Business by His Personal 
Representative in New York," 7 INTRA. L. R.Ev. 40 (1940); Cahn, "Estate Corporations," 
86 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 136 (1937). 
740 M1cHIGAN LAw REvmw [Vol. 57 
corporate situation-where the controlling shares are bequeathed 
to a trustee in trust-the court may imply a right to continue, 
whereas such right will not ordinarily be implied in the case 
of a non-corporate business.5 
Assuming that authority for continuation is present and 
exercised, it is commonly held that the executor or trustee has 
an obligation to the beneficiaries to take an active part in the 
operation of the corporate affairs, including the duty to control 
the board of directors if and when possible. 6 It follows that the 
fiduciary with control of the estate corporation will normally 
be serving not op.ly as a trustee or executor but also as an officer 
or director of the corporation. It is this dual capacity that gives 
rise to most of the major problems in the area. 
As suggested, the duty to be active in corporate management 
will ordinarily be meaningful only if the trust has "control" of 
the corporation, and ownership to a lesser degree will raise few 
peculiar problems.7 But to find this "control" it is not always 
necessary that the estate or trust hold the majority stock interest 
in its own right. If the fiduciary individually owns some, but 
less than a majority, of the corporate stock, his holdings are added 
to those of the trust in determining whether the estate has the 
majority necessary for "control."8 Some courts would go a step 
further and attribute control to the trust when the fiduciary as 
an individual owns the majority stock in any corporation in which 
5 In re Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y.S. 466 (1927); Elias v. Schweyer, 13 App. Div. 
336, 43 N.Y.S. 55 (1897). See P-H WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUST SERV. 1[2193.l at p. 2197 
(1950); 27 VA. L. REv. 497 (1941). 
6 See P-H WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUST SERv. 1[2193.l at p. 2199; 27 VA. L. REv. 497 
(1941). Both articles rely partially on Elias v. Schweyer, 13 App. Div. 336, 43 N.Y.S. 55 
(1897), and In re Fidelity Loan, Trust &: Guaranty Co., 23 Misc. 211, 51 N.Y.S. 1124 
(1898), in which the trustee was already a director-officer and the question was whether 
it was proper for him to serve in such capacity. Trachtman, "Closely Held Businesses," 
90 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 668 (1951), suggests that if the fiduciary believes in the competence 
of present management and keeps himself thoroughly informed, he need not serve as 
director. It is probable that the director's actions would still be imputed to the trustee 
in any action for breach of trust so that the end result would probably be the same. 
7 Generally the courts consider any thing over a 50% stock ownership as "control." 
Presumably the considerations might be different if the corporation permitted cumulative 
voting. 
S In re Auditore's Estate, 136 Misc. 664, 240 N.Y.S. 502 (1930); Dailey v. Wright, 94 
Md. 269, 51 A. 38 (1902); In re Davidson's Estate, 89 N.Y.S. (2d) 224 (1949); Pyle v. Pyle, 
137 App. Div. 568, 122 N.Y.S. 256 (1910); In re Rappaport's Estate, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 741 
(1950); In re Witkind's Estate, 167 Misc. 885, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 933 (1938). See generally Cahn, 
"Estate Corporations," 86 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 136 (1937)'; 161 A.L.R. 1038 (1946). 
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the trust or estate also has some interest.9 Others insist that the 
trustee who independently owns a majority interest is free to vote 
that stock and take action as a director without primary regard 
for the estate's interests.10 
The usual fiduciary duty imposes on the trustee an obligation 
0f absolute fidelity to the beneficiary's interest, and he will not 
be permitted to place himself in a position where interests of 
his own or of others may conflict with that of his beneficiary.11 
The possibility of extending this duty beyond its traditional con-
text furnishes the questions of primary importance in the area 
of estate corporations; whether expressly12 or impliedly, the courts 
dealing with the individual acting both as trustee and director 
have sometimes ignored the corporate form of doing business13 
and extended this duty of the trustee to act solely for the bene-
ficiary so as to apply it also to the trustee-director's14 actions as 
a corporate director.15 When, if ever, this should be done to protect 
the beneficiary, and when the corporate form should be preserved 
in order to protect its integrity and usefulness is the question to 
which the courts must furnish an answer. 
A corporate director's ·wrongful act customarily creates a 
single right of action in the corporation, to be enforced through 
9 In re Barrett's Estate, 168 Misc. 937, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 689 (1938). 
l0E.g., Matter of Sullivan, 169 Misc. 16, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 783 (1938), affd. 255 App. Div. 
1008, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 533 (1938). 
11 For a valuable discussion of the fiduciary duty, see Hoover, "Basic Principles 
Underlying the Duty of Loyalty," 5 Cu:VE.-MARSH. L. REv. 7 (1956). Also see I Scorr, 
TRUsrs §2.5 (1939). 
12 Erickson v. Starling, 233 N.C. 1539, 64 S.E. (2d) 832 (1951); In re Doelger's Estate, 
164 Misc. 590, 299 N.Y.S. 565 (1937), revd. 254 App. Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 334 (1938), 
affd. In re Doelger's Will, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E. (2d) 42 (1938); Pyle v. Pyle, 137 App. 
Div. 568, 122 N.Y.S. 256 (1910). 
13 As a matter of terminology it may be inaccurate to suggest that a court is "ignoring 
the corporate form" merely by applying trust rules to the actions of the trustee-director. 
In this view of the matter, no question of "corporate form" is ever reached since the trust 
rules merely circumscribe the discretion of the individual director because of his addi-
tional legal status as trustee. On the other -hand, this phrase can be meaningfully em-
ployed to describe any situation in which the court, for one reason or another, refuses 
to apply the rule that would govern the normal corporate situation, and instead adopts 
some other rule in order to bring about a desired result. As suggested above, where there 
is a conflict between the rule applicable to corporate directors and that applicable to 
trustees, the courts frequently will refuse to apply the corporate rule. This is what is 
meant here by "ignoring" or "avoiding" the corporate form. 
14 Throughout this comment the words "trust" and "estate" are used interchangeably. 
"Director" and "officer" will also not be distinguished since for purposes of examining 
problems peculiar to estate corporations, there are no useful distinctions between the two. 
16 See generally Durand, "Changing Concepts of Trust Investments," 95 TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES 907 (1956); Cahn, "Estate Corporations," 86 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 136 (1937). 
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a stockholder's derivative suit. But when the corporation involved 
is an estate corporation, it seems settled, at least in New York, 
that such misconduct gives rise to separate and independent 
causes of action in both the corporation and the trust benefici-
aries.16 The beneficiaries' action will be based on breach of trust 
and the recovery from the trustee will be an amount measured 
by the reduction in value of the estate's stock caused by his wrong-
ful act as director.17 From the language used, these courts seem 
willing to carry this concept of liability to the extent of allowing 
two full and separate recoveries. However, in none of these 
cases had there been a previous recovery,18 so the question of 
double recovery was not directly in issue. It would seem that the 
rationale underlying allowance of two recoveries is sound, at least 
when there are minority interests in the corporation independent 
of the trust holdings. If a derivative suit were instituted after 
the beneficiaries had already recouped their loss, anything less 
than judgment for the full damage to the corporation could 
well be destructive of the rights of such minority stockholders. 
Anything collected in this action would belong to the corporation 
as a whole so that if the beneficiaries' previous recovery were 
deducted from the later judgment, the portion of the amount 
remaining which would accrue to the minority would not repre-
sent its full damages. 
An even greater departure from traditional corporate concepts 
than two recoveries for one wrong is the possibility that appli-
cation of fiduciary rules to estate corporations will mean that 
acts of the trustee-director which are perfectly proper and bene-
ficial from a corporate standpoint may still be a breach of trust 
because they are not strictly in the immediate interest of the 
life beneficiary.19 Conversely, the action most desirable to this 
income beneficiary may be undesirable from an overall corporate 
viewpoint, because it raises the threat of liability in a derivative 
16 See Matter of Auditore, 249 N.Y. 335 (1928); In re Gerbereux's Will, 148 Misc. 
461, 266 N.Y.S. 134 (1933); In re Greenberg's Estate, 149 Misc. 275, 267 N.Y.S. 384 (1933). 
:rhe result in other states would likely be the same though the cases are not as plentiful. 
Compare In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 574, 284 N.W. 876 (1939), with Rossi v. Davis, 
345 Mo. 362, 133 S.W. (2d) 363 (1939). 
17 In re Auditore's Estate, 136 Misc. 664, 240 N.Y.S. 502 (1930). See P-H WILLS, 
EsrATES AND TRUsr SERV. 1[2193.1 at p. 2204 (1950). 
1s In In re Auditore's Estate, 136 Misc. 664, 240 N .Y.S. 502 (1930), there was an 
outstanding judgment from a previous derivative suit but it was no longer collectible. 
19 E.g., notes 30 and 40 infra. 
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suit. As an example, the establishment of corporate reserves is 
necessary to the general business interest of the corporation as 
an entity. But such reserves would be highly prejudicial to a life 
beneficiary interested only in income, and would be improper 
in the ordinary trust where no corporation is imposed. Thus it 
is obvious that the trustee may be faced with competing interests, 
both of which it will be impossible to satisfy. Where such a con-
flict exists the court may sometimes feel that it would be justifiable 
to follow the fiduciary duty through the corporate veil and require 
the trustee-director to adhere to conduct most favorable to the 
beneficiary. But while the possibility of a disregarding of form 
should be considered when the estate plan is being formulated, 
it should cause few problems to the enlightened trustee holding 
the entire issue of corporate stock. If he consistently acts in the 
interest of the immediate beneficiaries, to the extent required 
by usual trust rules, there will be no one with standing to object 
to his conduct. The fact that the trustee has not always adhered 
to this course has been the cause of much needless litigation. A 
real problem for the fiduciary does arise, however, when the trust 
or estate holds less than all the corporate stock. It may be argued 
that the majority stockholders and directors elected thereby are 
free to plan their actions solely with regard to what is most bene-
ficial to the majority-in this case the trust. If this is true, the 
trustee who looks only to the beneficiaries' advantage would again 
be safe. However, the more modem approach has often been to 
attach a fiduciary aspect to the corporate director-corporate mi-
nority relation and consequently to find a duty on the part of 
the director to act in the best interest of the corporation as a 
whole.20 If, then, the estate holds the controlling but not the entire 
stock, action taken in the interest of the trust may, in some in-
stances, bring about an objection by the minority that such acts 
were not taken in the best interests of the corporation. Yet even 
in a jurisdiction recognizing responsibility to the minority stock-
holders, it would still be logically possible to brush aside the 
objections of some minority groups. If the court is willing to 
make an exception to the fiduciary duty where the minority takes 
its interest with notice that the estate is in control of the corpo-
20 Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., (7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 369, cert. den. 316 U.S. 675 
(1941). See Elevator Supplies Co. v. Wylde, 106 N.J. Eq. 163, 150 A. 347 (1930). But see 
Kirwan v. Parkway Distillery, 285 Ky. 605, 148 S.W. (2d) 720 (1941). 
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ration, then it could be reasoned that the minority in a post 
mortem corporation or a minority which acquired its stock sub-
sequent to the testator's death has such notice and is bound by 
it.21 This notice argument, however, would frequently be inappli-
cable to a subsequent purchaser, since he seldom would have 
actual notice, and it almost certainly could be of no help where 
there is an independent minority who obtained its stock before 
the testator's death. 
In general the courts have not yet been squarely faced with 
the spectre of conflicting fiduciary interests, so any observation as 
to its effect is largely speculation. Only a few decisions have even 
mentioned the problem,22 and in these cases the problem was not 
directly in issue. Nevertheless, the possibility of an objecting 
minority raises important issues· that may in the future be of 
major concern to the courts and should be considered along with 
any examination of the scope of the trustee-director's duty to 
the trust. 
III. Areas of Confiict 
A. Retention of Corporate Earnings. When the testator ex-
presses his intent in the will as to how the estate corporation is 
to be conducted, the courts have been almost unanimous in hold-
ing the trustee-director bound to carry out those directions.23 
The rationale is usually that having taken his authority from 
the will, the trustee is estopped to deny the validity of instructions 
in that instrument.24 If such directions are not in the best interest 
21 See In re Doelger's Estate, 164 Misc. 590, 299 N.Y.S. 565 (1937), revd. 254 App. 
Div. 178, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 334 (1938), affd. In re Doelger's Will, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E. (2d) 
42 (1938). See Cahn, "Estate Corporations," 86 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 136 (1937). 
22 In re Doelger's Estate, 164 Misc. 590, 299 N.Y.S. 565 (1937), revd. 254 App. Div. 
178, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 334 (1938), affd. In re Doelger's Will, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E. (2d) 42 
(1938); In re Trust under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W. (2d) 590 (1944); In 
re Peabody's Estate, 218 Wis. 541, 260 N.W. 444 (1935); 99 A.L,R. 956 (1935). In In re 
Hubbell's Will, 90 N.Y.S. (2d) 74, affd. 276 App. Div. 134, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 555 (1949), revd. 
302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E. (2d) 888 (1951), the Surrogate's Court partially based its decision 
on protection of the minority's rights but the decision was subsequently reversed. 
23 In re Doelger's Estate, 164 -Misc. 590, 299 N.Y.S. 565 (1937), revd. 254 App. Div. 
178, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 334 (1938), affd. In re Doelger's Will, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E. (2d) 42 
(1938); Elger v. Boyle, 69 Misc. 273, 126 N.Y.S. 946 (1910); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 
v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N.Y.S. 532 (1927); In re Trust under Will of Koffend, 218 
Minn. 206, 15 N.W. (2d) 590 (1944). But see Green v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 329 Pa. 
169, 196 A. 32 (1938). 
24 Elger v. Boyle, 69 Misc. 273, 126 N.Y.S. 946 (1910); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N.Y.S. 532 (1927); In re Trust under Will of Koffend, 218 
Minn. 206, 15 N.W. (2d) 590 (1944). 
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of the corporation and a pre-existing minority is present to contest, 
it might be doubted that the decedent's orders should still be 
controlling. To allow the orders to control in this situation would 
give the decedent power to take action through testamentary 
directions that he could not have taken as a director during life. 
However, there is no authority to this effect and the estoppel 
argument can still be urged against the fiduciary. More often 
the will does not contain instructions and the question then 
becomes whether the court will choose to uphold or look through 
the corporate entity as a matter of policy or implied intent. The 
problem is most vividly apparent when the trustee's action in 
the interest of the beneficiaries will result in non-recognition of 
one of those elements thought of as distinguishing the corporation 
from other business forms. One of these characteristics-the right 
of a corporation to retain a part of its earnings, for depreciation 
reserves or otherwise-has been the cause of a large part of the 
litigation in the estate corporation area and has arisen in several 
different settings. 
I. Corporate Debts. In 1937 two widely cited New York deci-
sions involving wholly-ovmed estate corporations invalidated the 
use of corporate income to pay to the estate a pre-existing debt of 
the corporation due the testator.25 While holding that such pay-
ments were in violation of the New York statute against accumula-
tions of trust income, since income then became part of the trust 
res over which the income beneficiaries had no claim, it was not 
denied that this was merely a conclusion reached after a decision 
based on policy or implied intent that the corporate form should 
give way in favor of the income beneficiary's claim to all corporate 
income.26 The corporation was likened to a "repository for assets" 
and it was concluded that under the circumstances corporate 
income can be treated as ordinary trust income.27 While the 
court in In re Adler's Estate28 intimated that the ·will terms may 
have shown testator's intent not to consider the corporation as a 
25 In re Adler's Estate, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y.S. 542 (1937); In re McLaughlin's 
Estate, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y.S. 559 (1937). 
26 See 38 CoL. L. REv. 942 (1938); 47 YALE L. J. 1026 (1938). 
27 In re Adler's Estate, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y.S. 542 (1937); In re McLaughlin's 
Estate, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y.S. 559 (1937). See Durand, "Changing Concepts of Trust 
Investments," 95 TRUSTS AND EsTATES 907 (1956), to the effect that in the area of principal 
and income, it is not unusual for the wholly owned corporation to be treated as an 
administrative device. · 
28164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y.S. 542 (1937). 
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separate entity, neither decision was actually based on the dis-
covery of an express intent but resulted more from a policy favor-
ing the income beneficiary. Under these circumstances the ex-
istence of a minority interest would not supply any strong addi-
tional arguments for an opposite result. Since it othenvise would 
have no right to share in the income involved, the disallowance of 
the payments and the implication that such funds must be paid 
out as dividends causes no harm to the minority. 
A suggestion was made in the Adler case, and in other cases as 
well, that the tendency to favor the income beneficiary over the 
interests of the corporation is more prevalent where the trustee-
directors are also remaindermen.29 This factor, however, even 
if considered by the court, will probably not be controlling be-
cause the courts have generally tended to favor the income bene-
ficiaries even where the the trustees are not remaindermen. 
2. Reserves. Where corporate ownership is entirely vested in 
the estate or trust and there is no history of income reserves from 
which an intent that they be continued could be clearly implied, 
most cases have found the establishment of reserves from corpor-
ate income to be improper.30 The Pennsylvania decisions alone 
have clearly indicated their disapproval of this patent disregard of 
the corporate entity.31 The courts have generally not attempted 
to justify such disregard on an implied intent theory, so that their 
results apparently fl.ow from a pure policy determination favoring 
the income beneficiary.32 If the reasoning were based on the im-
plied iritent of the testator for the corporation to be only an ad-
ministrative device, it would seem that ordinarily it could as 
easily be inferred that he would have desired the corporation to 
be empowered with all the normal corporate attributes.33 This 
29 See 47 YALE L. J. 1026 at 1031 (1938). 
ao In re Adler's Estate, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y.S. 542 (1937); In re McLaughlin's 
Estate, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y.S. 559 (1937). Both of these cases indicated they might 
exclude·temporary improvements made by the trustee which are not likely to last beyond 
the income beneficiary's interest. In re Hubbell's Will, 90 N.Y.S. (2d) 74 (1948), affd. 
276 App. Div. 134, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 555 (1949), revd. 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E. (2d) 888 (1951); 
Rossi v. Davis, 345 Mo. 362, 133 S.W. (2d) 363 (1939). Contra, Boyle v. John Boyle &: Co., 
136 App. Div. 367, 120 N.Y.S. 1048 (1910), rehg. den. 131 N.Y.S. 1105 (1911), affd. 200 
N.Y. 597, 94 N.E. 1092 (1911). 
81 Goetz's Estate (No. 1), 236 Pa. 630, 85 A. 65 (1912); Green v. Philadelphia Inquirer 
Co., 329 Pa. 169, 196 A. 32 (1938). 
82 See 38 Cot. L. REV. 942 (1938). . 
ss This would probably not be true if the facts show that the testator created the 
corporation before death but continued to deal with the corporate assets as his individual 
property. 
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has been the reasoning used by the Pennsylvania courts34 and at 
least one New York decision35 in holding the establishment of re-
serves to be proper. In any of the retention of earnings cases, it 
could also be argued that the court should infer a different intent 
according to whether the corporation in question comprises a 
going business or is an incorporation of the testator's invest-
ments.36 If the assets consist of investments, it may be probable that 
the corporation was formed merely as an instrument to conduct the 
individual's affairs with little thought of its ever being an operat-
ing entity with all the characteristics of such entities. 
If the decisions disallowing reserves are based purely on policy, 
it is very doubtful that such policy would be considered potent 
enough to overcome express will directions in favor of reserves. 
It would seem more likely that the policy against reserves would be 
held applicable only where testator's intent is unknown, although 
this would undoubtedly force New York to reappraise its ac-
cumulations statute.37 Besides going against most of the authority 
and finding no policy or intent opposed to corporate reserves,38 
the Pennsylvania courts have been unique in suggesting, by way 
of dicta, that typical corporate rights such as retention of earnings 
could not be overcome by contrary will expressions.89 
The situation where there is an independent minority interest 
presents greater problems for the trustee faced with the question 
whether to set up corporate reserves. The risk to an alert fiduci-
ary in that case is an inability to tell whether, in the absence of an 
intent expressed through testamentary instructions, the policy 
in favor of beneficiaries will be strong enough to overcome the 
justifiable interest of an independent minority in the establish-
ment of reserves, or whether a paying out of all corporate income 
will create a cause of action in the corporation. Cases of this type 
are not numerous enough to indicate a trend, but if the minority 
84 See note 31 supra. 
35 Boyle v. John Boyle & Co., 136 App. Div. 367, 120 N.Y.S. 1048 (1910), reh. den. 
131 N.Y.S. 1105 (1911), affd. 200 N.Y. 597, 94 N.E. 1092 (1911). 
36 See 27 YA. L. REV. 497 (1941). 
37 On its face the statute would be more clearly applicable where the will directs 
the establishment of reserves than in In re Adler's Estate, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y.S. 542 
(1937), and In re McLaughlin's Estate, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y.S. 559 (1937), discussed at 
note 25 supra, since the court in those cases was somewhat reluctant to apply the statute 
because there was no specific order to accumulate. 
88 See note 31 supra. 
39Ibid. 
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is not present and objecting, a court could cite cases involving 
wholly-owned corporations and strike down the reserves without 
actually considering the difference in problems.40 If the court 
recognizes an obligation of directors to act for the good of the 
corporation as a whole, however, the real need for adequate 
corporate reserves would seem to present a very attractive case 
for the application of that doctrine. Furthermore, such an obliga-
tion could be used to uphold reserves even in the face of contrary 
directions in the will. There is little doubt that any non-trust hold-
ings would be seriously damaged by a failure of the corporation 
to provide such reserves. And it should not logically affect the 
minority's rights that the testator as majority stockholder ordered 
the trustee-director to pay out all corporate income; the damage 
to the corporation would be the same.41 
3. Income Beyond Dividends. The third and most obvious test 
of the estate corporation's right to retain earnings is presented 
by a beneficiary's claim to corporate income beyond that declared 
as dividends. Essentially this is but the next logical step after a 
decision on the propriety of corporate reserves, since it is unlikely 
that the court would disallow reserves unless it was willing 
to follow with a decree that all income must be paid out. How-
ever, it is easier to find authority for saying the beneficiary has 
no claim beyond declared dividends42 than for permitting corpor-
ate reserves, and this may suggest a possible distinction between 
the two related areas. The ultimate effect on the corporate en-
tity of ordering earnings to be paid out beyond dividends de-
clared and of disallowing corporate reserves is probably no dif-
ferent. But since the right of the stockholder only to such income 
as is declared in dividends is one of the principal characteristics 
40 See In re Hilliard's Will, 164 Misc. 677, 299 N.Y.S. 788 (1937). But see In re 
Barrow's Will, 204 Misc. 339, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 501 (1953), affd. 283 App. Div. 995, 130 
N.Y.S. (2d) 914 (1954). . 
41 Whether the policy of carrying out will directions would be subserved in this 
case is not a question allowing accurate generalization. In re Barrow's Will, 204 Misc. 
339, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 501 (1953), affd. 283 App. Div. 995, 130 N.Y.S. (2d) 914 (1954), a 
recent New York case involving a minority interest but no testamentary directions per-
mitted corporate reserves, and this may indicate some recognition of minority rights. 
However, the opinion offers nothing to substantiate this, and it is just as likely that the 
court believed it was following the testator's intent. 
42Boyle v. John Boyle & Co., 136 App. Div. 367, 120 N.Y.S. 1048 (1910), reh. den. 
131 N.Y.S. 1105 (1911), affd. 200 N.Y. 597, 94 N.E. 1092 (1911); Dailey v. Wright, 94 Md. 
269, 51 A. 38 (1902); In re Fidelity Loan, Trust & Guaranty Co., 23 Misc. 211, 51 N.Y.S. 
1124 (1898); Goetz's Estate (No. 1), 236 Pa. 630, 85 A. 65 (1912); Green v. Philadelphia 
Inquirer Co., 329 Pa. 169, 196 A. 32 (1938). 
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generally thought of as distinguishing the corporation from other 
business forms, a claim to further income will more directly force 
the court to an immediate and open decision between recognition 
of the corporate form and the rights of the income beneficiary. 
This is true whether the corporation is wholly owned or is merely 
"controlled" by the trust. Therefore when an issue involves 
corporate rights and the court avoids directly facing the dividend 
question, as did the courts in many of the corporate reserve cases, 
it may decide the case without fully recognizing that a problem 
of ignoring the corporate form is involved. 
Most of the cases disallowing an enlarged right in corporate 
earnings have concerned corporations less than wholly owned by 
the estate.43 Whether or not this is a realization of the minority 
problem, it certainly shows a greater reluctance to treat such 
corporations as a mere device of administration. Again, in the 
dividend area, it seems that testamentary directions should not 
affect the strength of objections by independent owners. Yet the 
only authority for this proposition is dicta in certain Pennsylvania 
cases.44 
B. Corpo·:ate Salaries. The propriety of payment of a corporate 
salary to a trustee-director over and above his compensation from 
the estate raises a problem slightly different from those previously 
examined, although it too could be analyzed as involving a fail-
ure to pay out all corporate earnings to the income beneficiaries. 
However, since the salary question directly concerns only the 
personal rights and obligations of the trustee, many courts would 
not even analyze this as a corporate entity problem.45 Moreover, 
while this problem is still one of conflicting interests, it is perhaps 
more of a conflict of the beneficiary's interest with the fiduciary's 
personal interest than with the interest of the corporation as a 
whole. 
It is not difficult to find a number of decisions disapproving 
corporate salaries paid to a trustee-director as being inconsistent 
with his fiduciary duty.46 But in contrast to most of the other 
43 Boyle v. John Boyle & Co., 136 App. Div. 367, 120 N.Y.S. 1048 (1910), reh. den. 
131 N.Y.S. 1105 (1911), affd. 200 N.Y. 597, 94 N.E. 1092 (1911); Dailey v. Wright, 94 Md. 
269, 51 A. 38 (1902); In re Fidelity Loan, Trust & Guaranty Co., 23 Misc. 211, 51 N.Y.S. 
1124 (1898). 
44 See note 31 supra. 
45 See In re Steinberg's Estate, 153 Misc. 339, 274 N.Y.S. 914 (1934). 
46 In re Grossman's Estate, 157 Misc. 164, 283 N.Y.S. 323 (1935), affd. 294 N.Y.S. 942 
(1937). And see Elias v. Schweyer, 13 App. Div. 336, 43 N.Y.S. 55 (1897). Both of these cases 
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areas of estate corporations the trend, especially in more recent 
years, seems to be toward upholding such payments and conse-
quently toward recognition of the corporate entity.47 Most of the 
decisions finding a conflict of interests and disallowing the salary 
payments have reasoned that receipt of a corporate salary by the 
fiduciary will generate a personal interest in the continued ex-
istence of the corporation so that he would be unwilling to sell 
the estate's holdings even, if a highly advantageous offer were 
received.48 In several of these cases there were other acts of serious 
misconduct by the trustee49 so that it is impossible to determine 
whether the salary question standing alone would have precipi-
tated the same result. 
Courts permitting corporate compensation are often the same 
courts that have denied the corporate right to retain income, and 
thus reluctance to look through the corporate veil has not been 
the basis for allowing the compensation. The earlier decisions 
often involved a trustee who was a salaried officer of the corpora-
tion before the testator's death, so it was not difficult to imply an 
intent that this salary should continue.50 While such a finding of 
intent would always make it easier to uphold th:: salary, the 
involved corporations wholly owned by the estate. Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. I, 144 S.E. 787 
(1928); In re Hirsch's Estate, 116 App. Div. 367, IOI N.Y.S. 893 (1906), affd. 188 N.Y. 584, 81 
N.E. 1165 (1907); Matter of Kirkman, 143 Misc. 342, 256 N.Y.S. 495 (1932); Pyle v. Pyle, 
137 App. Div. 568, 122 N.Y.S. 256 (1910), all involving corporations less than wholly 
owned by the estate. And see 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §170.22 (1956). 
47 In re Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y.S. 466 (1927); In re Davidson's Estate, 89 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 224 (1949); Lawrence v. Garner, 48 Hun (N.Y.) 618, I N.Y.S. 534 (1888); Rossi v. 
Davis, 345 Mo. 362, 133 S.W. (2d) 363 (1939); In re Smythe's Estate, 6 Misc. (2d) 130, 36 
N.Y.S. (2d) 605 (1942), all involving wholly owned corporations. Dailey v. Wright, 94 
Md. 269, 51 A. 38 (1902); In re Fidelity Loan, Trust and Guaranty Co., 23 Misc. 211, 51 
N.Y.S. II24 (1898); In re Gerbereux's Will, 148 Misc. 461, 266 N.Y.S. 13,t (1933); In re 
Matchette's Estate, 183 Misc. 228, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 561 (1944); ,In re Peabody's Estate, 218 
Wis. 541, 260 N.W. 444 (1935); 99 A.L.R. 956 (1935); In re Teasdale's Estate, 261 Wis. 
248, 52 N.W. (2d) 366 (1952); Williams v. Bond, 120 Va. 678, 91 S.E. 627 (1917); In re 
Witkind's Estate, 167 Misc. 885, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 933 (1938), involving corporations less than 
wholly owned. 
48 Elias v. Schweyer, 13 App. Div. 336, 43 N.Y.S. 55 (1897); In re Grossman's Estate, 
157 Misc. 164, 283 N.Y.S. 323 (1935), affd. 294 N.Y.S. 942 (1937); In re Hirsch's Estate, 
116 App. Div. 367, 101 N.Y.S. 893 (1906), affd. 188 N.Y. 584, 81 N.E. 1165 (1907); Pyle 
v. Pyle, 137 App. Div. 568, 122 N.Y.S. 256 (1910). 
49 Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. 1, 144 S.E. 787 (1928); In re Grossman's Estate, 157 Misc. 
164, 283 N.Y.S. 323 (1935), affd. 294 N.Y.S. 942 (1937); In re Hirsch's Estate, 116 App. 
Div. 367, 101 N.Y.S. 893 (1906), affd. 188 N.Y. 584, 81 N.E. ll65 (1907); Matter of Kirkman, 
143 Misc. 342, 256 N.Y.S. 495 (1932). 
50 In re Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y.S. 466 (1927); Lawrence v. Garner, 48 Hun 
(N.Y.) 618, 1 N.Y.S. 534 (1888). And see 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §170.22 (1956), citing many 
cases. 
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later decisions clearly do not rely on prior corporate service. The 
decisive factor is the court's feeling that the extra services involved 
in running a corporation deserve additional compensation and 
that any potential conflict of interests is so remote that it may be 
ignored until it is actually shown to have affected the fiduciary's 
conduct.51 It should be noticed, however, that the mere allowance 
of a corporate salary does not necessarily mean that the corporate 
entity is in theory left untouched. In Wisconsin, for example, 
trustees' salaries are measured by a standard of "reasonableness." 
When this problem was before it, the Wisconsin court simply 
added the corporate and trust salaries of the fiduciary and then 
decided that since the total was a reasonable trustee's compensa-
tion, the payment was proper.52 On the other hand, New York fixes 
trustees' salaries as a percentage of sums received and paid out 
and of trust income accounted for,53 so that any salary paid as 
director will be in addition to the statutory maximum for trustees. 
Therefore, to allow the extra compensation the court must 
treat the corporation as a separate body. But even if the corporate 
entity is generally fully recognized, it seems safe to say that the 
policy permitting corporate salaries is not so strong that it would 
overcome contrary will directions.54 
Under limited circumstances it is possible that a minority in-
terest might also object to corporate salaries, so it may again be 
profitable to distinguish the wholly-owned corporation from that 
only "controlled" by the trust. Under the New York approach, 
the independent stockholders might argue that since the trustee is 
receiving his full statutory compensation from the estate, the 
additional sums are an unnecessary expenditure of corporate 
funds, part of which would otherwise accrue to the stockholders. 
Yet this seems a rather weak argument, not only because it in 
a sense calls for disregard of the entity, but also because reasonable 
compensation for actual services cannot realistically be termed un-
necessary expense. A somewhat stronger objection could arise 
under the Wisconsin view unless the court is careful in its analysis. 
The totaling device could make a trustee-director's overall 
51 See note 45 supra. And see 27 VA. L. REV. 497 (1941). 
52 In re Peabody's Estate, 218 Wis. 541, 260 N.W. 444 (1935); 99 A.L.R. 956 (1935); 
In re Teasdale's Estate, 261 Wis. 248, 52 N.W. (2d) 366 (1952). 
53 N.Y. Surrogates Court Act, §285. 
54 In re Stulman's Will, 146 Misc. 861, 263 N.Y.S. 197 (1933). And see P-H W1u.s, 
EsrATES AND TRUSTS SERV., 1J2193.l (1950). 
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compensation "reasonable" and proper even where the corpora-
tion was bearing a greater proportion of the salary than the 
fiduciary's services to it would ordinarily justify.55 
C. Accounting. Whenever in a trustee's accounting proceeding 
the beneficiaries of the estate or trust demand a full disclosure 
of corporate records and activities, another area of conflict be-
tween the interests of the beneficiaries and the interest of the 
corporation as a whole is presented. Unlike the conflict raised by 
retention of corporate income, however, an accounting does not 
put in question a characteristic thought of as basic to the ordinary 
corporation. Probably for this reason the decisions in this area 
provide more certainty. Where the estate has held anything over 
50 percent of the corporate stock, the courts have been close to 
unanimity in treating the trustee-director's actions as director as 
a part of his duties as trustee and thus requiring a disclosure of 
corporate records and activities. 56 If the estate owns less than all 
the corporate stoc"!t, some, 57 but not all, 58 of these courts would 
apparently require an allegation of ·wrongdoing by the trustee 
before ordering the disclosure. If the trust has complete owner-
ship, the only persons that could be damaged by an open publica-
tion of corporate information are the beneficiaries themselves. 
However, an existing independent minority certainly may con-
tend that an accounting decree which permits disclosure of con-
fidential corporate operations will be harmful to the corporation.59 
But because an accounting is neither as immediately harmful 
55 It is probable that "reasonable" will be given a broad construction and doubtful 
that the court will be willing to define too closely what part of a reasonable total should 
be allowed for corporate services. 
56 Farmers Loan &: Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N.Y.S. 532 (1927); In re 
Kadison's Estate, 265 App. Div. 870, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 909 (1942); In re Steinberg's Estate, 
153 Misc. 339, 274 N.Y.S. 914 (1934), involving wholly-owned corporations. In re Davidson's 
Estate, 89 N.Y.S. (2d) 224 (1949); Erickson v. Starling, 233 N.C. 539, 64 S.E. (2d) 832 
(1951); In re Greenberg's Estate, 149 Misc. 275, 267 N.Y.S. 384 (1933); In re Hubbell's 
Will, 90 N.Y.S. (2d) 74, affd. 276 App. Div. 134, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 555 (1949), revd. 302 N.Y. 
246, 97 N.E. (2d) 888 (1951); In re Rappaport's Estate, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 741 (1950); In re 
Witkind's Estate, 167 Misc. 885, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 933 (1938), all "controlled"' by the estate 
or by the trustee because of the estate stock. But see In re Browning's Will, 258 App. 
Div. 621, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 557 (1940). And see 15 A.L.R. (2d) 11 (1951). It should not matter 
that the minority interest is held by the fiduciary -but this may affect the court's thinking. 
57 See, e.g., In re Paddock's Estate, 186 Wis. 544, 203 N.W. 34.7 (1925); In re Stewart's 
Estate, 167 Misc. 361, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 985 (1937). 
58 See, e.g., In re Rappaport's Estate, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 741 (1950); In re Witkind's 
Estate, 167 Misc. 885, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 933 (1938). 
59 Durand, "Changing Concepts of Trust Investments," 95 TRusrs AND EsTATES 907 
(1956). 
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to the "corporation" nor as patently in disregard of the entity as 
is a disposal of all income, and because of the real need for keep-
ing the fiduciary's actions open to inspection, the minority would 
probably have trouble impressing its argument on the court. 
There have been almost no cases mentioning the problem and 
none allowing it to prevent an inspection of corporate affairs.80 
Traditionally the courts have held that if the individual trustee 
and the estate together own only a minority interest, or if the 
fiduciary has control independent of the estate stock, beneficiaries 
have no right to demand an accounting which includes disclosure 
of corporate records. 61 The usual rationale has been that the 
corporate acts cannot be considered to be those of the trustee and 
the trustee is not in a position to acquire control of the corporate 
records. Because of such reasoning, and probably because of many 
peaceful years without complaint by non-estate interests, some 
recent decisions seem to take the further step of allowing an in-
spection of corporate records by minority estate interests at least 
where the trustee is in fact in a position to procure the records.62 
These cases may try to support their result by stating that the 
inspection is a limited one only. But where the "limit" is an 
inspection of all records necessary to determine if there has been 
fraud or wrongdoing by the fiduciary, it is actually no "limit" 
at all. 63 Despite a justifiable desire to protect the beneficiaries 
of a trust against the wrongdoing trustee, this could prove to be 
a serious invasion of the majority's interests in situations where 
disclosure of corporate records might be harmful to the interests of 
the corporation as a whole. 
D. Creditors. In general, the courts have been rather liberal 
in crossing over and extinguishing the lines between the trust 
and the wholly-owned estate corporation in order to aid the credi-
60 In re Hubbell's Will, 90 N.Y.S. (2d) 74, affd. 276 App. Div. 134, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 
555 (1949), revd. 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E. (2d) 888 (1951), used such an argument to disallow 
an accounting in the lower court but the decision was reversed. See also In re Ebbets' 
Estate, 149 Misc. 260, 267 N.Y.S. 268 (1933). 
61 In re Ebbets' Estate, 149 Misc. 260, 267 N.Y.S. 268 (1933); In re Ebbets' Will, 190 
Misc. 821, 76 N.Y.S. (2d) 36 (1947); Matter of Sullivan, 169 Misc. 16, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 783 
(1938), affd. 255 App. Div. 1008, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 533 (1938); In re Wainwright's Estate, 
55 N.Y.S. (2d) 303 (1945). But see In re Barret's Estate, 168 Misc. 937, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 689 
(1938). 
62 In re Murray's Will, 88 N.Y.S. (2d) 579 (1949); In re Shehan's Will, 285 App. Div. 
785, 141 N.Y.S. (2d) 439 (1955), rearg. den. 286 App. Div. 953, 143 N.Y.S. (2d) 668 (1955). 
63 Ibid. 
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tors of either.64 In view of the general attitude of the judiciary 
in the estate corporation field, such a result is not surprising where 
the estate owns the entire corporate interest. Certainly, however, 
no court should go so far as to allow an estate creditor to enforce 
his claim against a corporation with an independent minority 
interest. 65 
IV. Conclusion 
In the broad area of estate corporations there has not as yet 
been sufficient litigation to provide a quantity of established rules. 
It appears that only the courts of New York have considered a sub-
stantial number of such cases, and even there the results cannot 
be termed conclusive. It seems likely that future years will pro-
duce an increased volume of decisions on this complex subject, 
with some of them reaching into the still untouched area of con-
flicting fiduciary duties. When this does occur, some of the past 
decisions may be less than helpful unless the court is careful to 
analyze the various and distinct problems involved. 
At present the picture is one of no great reluctance to ignore 
the corporate form and apply traditional trust rules to corporate 
action whenever the court feels that general policy or the testator's 
intent calls for such result. This is certainly the case where the 
corporation is wholly owned by the trust, and seems only slightly 
less true where at least a controlling interest is so owned. In ac-
cordance with this approach, some courts may indicate a willing-
ness to advise in advance of the propriety of particular corporate 
action, although they may refuse to suggest the details of the 
action.66 Helpful perspective may be gained if it is recognized 
that there is probably a trend in all sections of American law 
not to let the corporate form interfere with what is believed to be 
a correct result. 67 
64 See In re Daly, 158 Misc. 659, 287 N.Y.S. 957 (1935), affd. 246 App. Div. 759, 283 
N.Y.S. 929 (1935), where the corporate creditor was allowed to sue the estate; In re 
George's Will, 256 App. Div. 270, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 533 (1939), where payments by the corpora• 
tion to an estate creditor were permitted; In re Lesser's Estate, 154 Misc. 364, 277 N.Y.S. 
123 (1935), where sums due the corporation were set off against the creditor's claim against 
the estate. 
65 In In re Abramowitz' Estate, 170 Misc. 68, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 846 (1939), the estate owned 
24¼ out of the 25 corporate shares, and the estate creditor was allowed to enjoin improper 
corporate action that would have destroyed the corporate assets. The court seemed to 
treat the corporation as being wholly owned. 
66 See, e.g., In re Pulitzer's Estate, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (1931). 
67 See STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 2d ed., §18 (1949); Cahn, "Estate Corporations," 
86 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 136 (1937). 
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Most articles in this field have concluded that the estate corpor-
ation serves a highly useful function and that its usefulness should 
not be slowly impaired by application of trust rules to corporate 
action.68 This is probably true, but in some situations the court 
could hardly be criticized for allowing basic concepts of fairness 
to overcome arguments based purely on form. And it also should 
be recognized that a limited disregard of corporate entity may not 
greatly endanger the utility of the estate corporation. At least 
as great a threat to the estate corporation is an uncertainty in 
treatment that would not only lead to disuse but would cause 
qualified trustees to refuse the trust rather than accept the 
attendant risks. If the corporation is wholly owned, the trustee-
director will apparently be safe in taking the action that is 
immediately most profitable to the trust beneficiary although 
technically it is not in the best interest of the corporation. But 
if the corporation is not wholly owned by the trust, it is not 
possible to state categorically what conduct will protect the trustee. 
If the will includes instructions as to corporate action, the trustee-
director who follows them has the support of all present authority, 
but he could still have reason for not feeling entirely comfortable. 
If the fiduciary can get the court to advise as to the proper course 
of action, he will be protected, but the right to such advice is 
not yet entirely clear. Beyond this the trail-markers are still dim 
and do not present the desired path of certainty. It is to be 
hoped that the courts in dealing with estate corporations will 
realize the utility of these entities and make every attempt to 
harmonize the areas of conflict and provide needed stability for 
an area of uncertainty. 
John P. Williams, S. Ed. 
68 See Cahn, "Estate Corporations," 86 UNiv. PA. L. R.Ev. 136 (1937); 27 VA. L. R.Ev. 
·197 (1941). 
